When the Quincy Institute was founded in 2019, many hawkish members of the Washington foreign policy establishment moved quickly to try and discredit the nascent think tank and its vision of international engagement. Whereas a number of major foreign policy institutions in the nation’s capital are funded by defense contractors and foreign governments, Quincy has attracted attention for bringing together two of the country’s most seemingly disparate funders: the libertarian Charles Koch Institute and the progressive, George Soros-backed Open Society Foundations. But as Quincy’s chairman of the board Suzanne DiMaggio explains, this transpartisan setup is in Quincy’s DNA.

Quincy brings together the left and right not via compromise, but through shared interests that happen to intersect. On foreign policy, DiMaggio says, that means an end to America’s “forever wars” and the country’s bomb-first, ask-questions-later mentality. A longtime diplomat with experience working on tense relationships like North Korea and Iran, DiMaggio co-founded Quincy with a handful of conservative and progressive foreign policy thinkers such as Andrew Bacevich. In a recent conversation with Blue Tent, Dimaggio discussed Quincy’s transpartisan origins, her hopes for a diplomatic revival under President Joe Biden, the future of America’s relationships in the Middle East, and more.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

BT: How did the idea for the Quincy Institute come about, and how did you and the other founders decide to make this happen?

SD: A group of us have been frustrated with the direction of U.S. foreign policy for a while, now. We saw the need for a new organization to provide the space for debate on key assumptions that have been relied on to construct foreign policy over decades.

One view we share is that applying the global war on terror as an organizing principle for U.S. foreign policy over the past two decades was not serving the interests of Americans. In fact, it obscured real and growing threats like climate change, and as we’ve all experienced this past year, deadly pandemics. It also led to the expansive use of military force at the expense of diplomacy.

The philosophy behind the Quincy Institute does not belong just to progressives; conservative voices also favor rethinking U.S. foreign policy and how we engage with the world. There are limited opportunities for progressives and conservatives to work together in this age of hyper-partisanship, and we recognized the need for a bridge on national security issues. We were inspired by transpartisan collaboration on criminal justice reform, which has resulted in a number of notable achievements.

There’s a similar coalescing on the need to push back on the mindset that leads to and facilitates endless war. That was the seed that grew into what Quincy is today— progressives and conservatives working together for peaceful, vigorous engagement with the world, sharply moving away from the militarism of the past decades. We’ve been assailed by critics, rather unfairly, who claim this approach is isolationist in nature. In fact, the opposite is true—we’re advocating for more engagement, smarter engagement. Some view this as radical. 

The fact that an institute dedicated to redirecting the emphasis in U.S. foreign policy from militarism to diplomacy is producing serious bouts of anxiety within certain circles in Washington tells us that something is deeply amiss. And it shows why an organization like Quincy is needed. Leading with diplomacy, backed up by military action as an option of absolute last resort, should be the norm, not the exception. 

BT: One of the first things many observers point out is that Quincy received funding from both the progressive, Soros-backed Open Society Foundations as well as the conservative Charles Koch Institute. How did Quincy get money from such seemingly opposed groups?

SD: Among Quincy’s co-founders and early supporters, we had connections to Open Society Foundations and the Charles Koch Institute, both of which were supporting organizations and projects that favor military restraint. I give credit to Quincy’s CEO Lora Lumpe, who was working at Open Society at the time. She made the outreach to Will Ruger at the Charles Koch Institute that sparked the partnership. Another one of Quincy’s founding funders, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, under the leadership of Stephen Heintz, played an essential role as an incubator for developing the ideas and principles that formed Quincy’s foundation. Together, they saw great potential in joining forces to imagine a different way forward. 

In this day and age of fundraising, when it can be both competitive and partisan, bringing together different voices that appear to be ideologically opposed offers a creative and durable approach to problem-solving. If you can find an area where there’s common ground and build on it, you can create a movement.

BT: I want to stay on the Koch connection for a moment, as the Koch network has been known in the past to do these “pivots” in order to rehabilitate its image, taking up issues like criminal justice reform and promoting their charitable work. Were you and other Quincy leaders fearful of being a pawn in a branding effort by the Kochs?

SD: What’s important to us is being able to build Quincy in a very independent way, and not be beholden to any funder’s views or to have any onerous restrictions placed on our work. This principled approach doesn’t just apply to a single funder; it applies to all of Quincy’s funders, which have grown into a diverse group of supporters. Fortunately, I can say we’ve been able to maintain a strong, independent voice while working in close partnership with our supporters. In fact, these partnerships help to broaden Quincy’s tent and amplify our impact.

BT: As you alluded to, after Quincy’s founding, a number of both neoconservatives and neoliberal foreign policy thinkers bashed the project, which you were probably expecting. What about supporters? Who are Quincy’s allies in the think tank and advocacy world, and have you been at all surprised by the people who have supported Quincy?

SD: It’s been a remarkable journey so far. The supporters far outweigh the critics, and we’ve been heartened to receive the support of a range of individuals and groups, including American and international diplomats, military veterans, policymakers, advocates, scholars, and students, among others. Quincy’s emphasis on investing in and leading with diplomacy is resonating widely. Our roster of non-resident fellows—many of whom are based outside the beltway, across the U.S.—shows the breadth of expertise Quincy has been able to attract. Another place we’ve gained traction is on the Hill, where we’ve managed to generate bipartisan support for some key initiatives, a rarity these days.

BT: There’s been a big push in recent years on both the left and right to see policymaking as closely connected to organizing, on every issue from minimum wage to healthcare to climate change. Even after the Iraq war, which inspired a lot of opposition, foreign policy seems to remain one of the last truly elite-dominated sectors of politics. From your vantage as a progressive, do you foresee this changing?

SD: I would agree with that assessment. From the viewpoint of a progressive, the impact of progressive thinking on the U.S. domestic policy agenda has been quite striking. Many of these views have now become mainstream. We have not yet seen a similar influence at this scale in the area of foreign policy. One of the reasons I became involved with the Quincy Institute was to try to widen the aperture for the progressive movement’s impact on issues related to national security and foreign policy.

To be sure, progressive voices are gaining prominence in these areas, but there’s still an enormous amount of work to do. The so-called “Blob” in Washington foreign policy circles is alive and well, but a number of developments, most notably the COVID pandemic, have underscored the urgency for a change in approach. The massive amounts of spending on U.S. defense did not protect us from the pandemic. It’s clear we need a fundamental rethinking of what it means to keep Americans safe.

One area where progressives have had success in influencing the U.S. foreign policy agenda is the elevation of climate change as a key threat—it’s an important shift requiring new ways of thinking about what constitutes U.S. national security and how we allocate our resources. 

BT: Thus far, Biden has stacked much of his foreign policy team with people who would be seen as establishment thinkers, including a number of people with connections to weapons manufacturers, either through previous think tank jobs, board memberships or consulting. Are you worried about the makeup of Biden’s foreign policy team?

SD: The Biden team is an experienced group of professionals who know how to get a new administration up and running quickly, a clear priority after four years of serious damage wrought by the Trump administration. From this perspective, “getting the band back together” is welcomed. But the possibility for groupthink among members of such a tight-knit group is a concern. Without new voices at the table, will this team revert back to old ways of thinking? Will their approach be limited to restoring U.S. foreign policy to a pre-Trump mode, or will they go beyond that and offer a truly different vision for America’s role in the world? Here’s where the Quincy Institute has a big role to play, by providing a forum for debate and generating the analyses and ideas that demonstrate a return to the status quo won’t cut it.

A number of early policies initiated by the Biden administration provide reason for optimism, such as ending U.S. support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen. At the same time, recent U.S. airstrikes in Syria are cause for alarm and point to a potential falling back to business as usual. The open-ended nature of decades-old AUMFs have provided legal cover to both Republican and Democratic administrations to perpetuate prolonged military conflict and have stripped Congress of its constitutionally mandated oversight role over matters of war and peace. The Quincy Institute is focusing on ensuring that the administration follows through on President Biden’s stated willingness to work with Congress to repeal these authorizations for the use of military force. 

Biden’s assertion that “diplomacy is back” is certainly welcomed. The tone is already dramatically different. One area we’ll be watching closely is the allocation of resources to diplomacy versus military expenditures. Are we, in fact, investing in and leading with diplomacy? The outcome of the administration’s global force posture review will be an important indicator. Our vast military footprint is counterproductive. If we’re going to lead with diplomacy, we need far greater resources invested in diplomacy. Quincy will have a lot to say about getting the priorities right.

BT: A big part of Biden’s job foreign-policy-wise will be rebuilding international relationships harmed by Trump, one of the most serious being Iran. Given how hard it was just to craft the 2015 nuclear agreement in the first place, do you think we can expect to see that relationship repaired during even eight years of a Biden presidency?

SD: Reentering the Iran nuclear deal, also known as the JCPOA, is a stated priority for the Biden administration because it concretely advances a key U.S. national security interest—namely, the rolling back of Iran’s nuclear program. A consistent, converging view has emerged from both the Biden team and Iranian officials: Both sides have indicated a readiness to return to their full JCPOA commitments on a compliance-for-compliance basis with no preconditions. This provides a clear way forward to getting diplomacy back on track. After rejoining the deal, we should join our allies and partners in an effort to reach a follow-on deal with Iran to extend the JCPOA, as well as pursue diplomatic talks on the range of issues where we have profound differences with Tehran, especially in the region.

Even under the best circumstances, a return to the JCPOA won’t be sufficient. As we’ve seen, even a solid nonproliferation agreement can be undermined and destroyed by political whims. We should be thinking more comprehensively about the U.S.-Iran relationship. From a U.S. point of view, this means making the pursuit of a less contentious relationship with Iran one of the priorities for American statecraft over the coming four, or hopefully, eight years. 

BT: One of the other big questions for the Biden administration is Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, which play a significant funding role in the foreign policy think tank and advocacy world. How do you see Biden handling Saudi Arabia, and how will their continued presence in Washington influence policy?

SD: The Biden administration’s “recalibration” with Saudi Arabia could be a key step toward a strategy that better serves American interests. Hopefully, it portends a new approach to the Middle East that repositions the United States as a stabilizing force and a responsible player in the region. Striking a U.S. strategic balance with Saudi Arabia and Iran should be part of such an approach. This will require a reassessment in U.S. policies toward Riyadh and Tehran, including a major effort to persuade both nations that developing an effective regional dialogue aimed at preventing and resolving conflicts would better serve their interests. 

And of course, governments in the region play a major funding role in the think tank world in Washington. There’s no doubt this is a practice that will continue. The Quincy Institute is taking a very different approach by not accepting funding from foreign governments. 

BT: Quincy is still a young and small organization, but in recent years, a number of nonprofit staffers have organized unions in their workplaces. Were they to do so, would you support Quincy staffers trying to form a union?

SD: Quincy launched in December 2019, with a dozen or so people, and now it’s up to about 25 full-time staffers and fellows, which is quite remarkable growth during a pandemic and an economic downturn. To my knowledge, the idea of union participation has never come up. If it were raised, we’d take it seriously and we’d engage in discussions.