During the 2020 general election, as fears of defeat were heightened by Democrats, a number of candidates with middling prospects of victory promised supporters around the country that their chances were much better than they were.
Two candidates in particular over-promised on their chances to the detriment of donors looking for races to fund. In Kentucky, Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell was being challenged by Air Force veteran Amy McGrath; and in South Carolina, Sen. Lindsey Graham faced off against Democratic party official Jaime Harrison.
Both McConnell and Graham presented tempting targets for Democrats. Seen as two of the more powerful and dishonest Republicans in the age of Trump, the chance of defeating either—or even both—was too much of an opportunity to let go. Harrison and McGrath both raised obscene amounts of money—for Harrison, $130 million; for McGrath, $88 million.
Most of the time, candidates who raise substantial sums of cash have a shot. But in these two cases, the final results were blowouts. Harrison lost to Graham 54.5% to 44.2%; McGrath fell to McConnell by a final result of 57.8% to 38.2%.
What are some takeaways from these two losing races that swallowed more than $200 million in a crucial election year?
1. Deceptive fundraising appeals are a problem
Fundraising appeals from McGrath and Harrison frequently touted close polling—like a Senate Majority PAC email blast sent on September 24 showing a tightening race in Kentucky. McGrath was “within striking distance” of the Senate Republican leader, it claimed, citing a poll by Data for Progress. What the email didn’t mention was that polls on September 16 and 22 showed McConnell with commanding leads of 12 and 15 points, respectively. In both the McGrath and Harrison races, fleeting favorable polls were far outweighed by surveys showing that both Republican incumbents were secure in their re-election. But that reality didn’t stop their campaigns and super PACs from spinning misleading polling numbers into gold.
The cherrypicking of polls by political fundraisers is common for a simple reason: it helps pump up contributions, even for doomed candidates. Democratic donors need to learn not to take the bait. Both 538 and RealClear Politics aggregate polling results to provide a far more accurate gauge of a candidate’s chances of winning. These sites should be the first stop for donors looking to see which races are close. As for the polls promoted by candidates and electoral groups like the Senate Majority PAC, keep in mind a simple rule: If the numbers look too good to be true, they probably are.
2. “Expressing donations” can be useful—if deployed well
“You wasted a lot of money,” Graham said to Harrison’s funders after defeating his opponent. Graham was right, but that didn’t have to be the case.
While both McGrath and Harrison rode the notoriety of their opponents to raise and spend substantial cash with no viable path to victory, their ability to tap into the anger of Democratic donors could have been put to better use. At least some of the gusher of cash they raised could have been diverted to invest in more lasting efforts to create political change in Kentucky and South Carolina.
“Ideally, expressive donations would create an opportunity for political organizers to raise money when it comes in easy so that they can spend it later—much as the biblical Joseph stored up crops in the years of plenty to maintain supplies in the years of famine,” Eitan Hersh wrote at The Atlantic on November 12, just over a week after McGrath and Harrison lost. “That upside, of course, relies on Joseph-like party operatives to lay the groundwork, hire full-time organizers, plan a long-term grassroots strategy, and keep momentum strong for when the flood of donations ends.”
3. Finite resources require more disciplined choices
Democratic candidates and electoral groups spent $8.4 billion in the 2020 election cycle, shattering all previous records. Still, even with so much money rolling in from donors, there was not enough to adequately fund all the important races happening that year. What was so frustrating about the vast river of money going to McGrath and Harrison, who were almost certain to lose, was the knowledge that other candidates around the country needed the money more.
In North Carolina, Republican Sen. Thom Tillis narrowly squeaked out a victory over Democratic challenger Cal Cunningham by only 1.8%. Cunningham, who came close to toppling Tillis, raised over $51 million, but it wasn’t quite enough to knock out the powerful incumbent. It’s an unknowable hypothetical whether or not another $10 or $20 million could have helped get him over the hump, but it’s not in question that the money would have been better spent in a tight race in North Carolina than in a losing blowout in South Carolina or Kentucky.
These decisions are hard to make in real-time. Emails and ads from candidates with unrealistic but emotionally gratifying pitches offer donors the fantasy they can get the net result—their enemies out of power—without putting in the work. But politics rarely works that way. Donors need to be super-disciplined about choosing which races to invest in. As importantly, they shouldn’t fixate on near-term electoral victories. “Going forward,” Hersh wrote, “if they want long-term power, political donors will need to invest their money not just in individual candidates, but in organizations that are focused on building that long-term power.”