That the 2020 election cycle was the most expensive in history is not surprising, given the amount of attention it received and the trend of elections growing more expensive than the preceding ones. The shocking thing for Democrats, however, is that so much of that money turned out not to have done much good.
Small donors contributed hundreds of millions to Senate candidates who lost by double digits. PAC money was unable to help Democrats in closer Senate races, as the party picked up only a single seat despite several looking vulnerable. In key House contests, Republicans outperformed Democrats despite having millions of dollars less per race, according to an analysis of toss-up contests from the Center for Responsive Politics. Democrats also had setbacks in down-ballot races, unable to flip a single state legislature and losing control of New Hampshire. At the presidential level, Democrats defeated President Donald Trump, but the primary elections saw some of the worst examples of vanity campaigns from billionaires.
Many of the Democrats’ strategic choices only look bad in hindsight. Republican Senator Susan Collins looked vulnerable in Maine, so donating to her opponent, Sara Gideon, made sense whether you were a major donor or a Resistance member with a few bucks to spare. Democrats needed just nine seats to win the Texas House, which would have been a historic accomplishment in a state that has been trending blue (or at least blue-ish) for years. No one contributing time or money to those races could have anticipated that Democrats wouldn’t pick up any seats at all. And though there are instances where cash was clearly being misspent—and many observers said so at the time—there’s a more sobering lesson in the failures of well-funded Democrats: In many cases, money isn’t enough to overcome disadvantages stemming from bad political environments, messaging failures or weak candidates.
There’s naturally a lot of debate about which of these factors played which part in which defeats, and a great deal of back and forth about what a winning message should be in which place. What’s more clear at this point is where large amounts of money were spent without leading to victory. Here are some of the most notable places Democrats spent and lost.
Tom Steyer’s presidential campaign
This was not the biggest money burn of the 2020 campaign, but it was by far the silliest. The hedge fund billionaire spent $340 million of his own money on a primary campaign that was never going anywhere. Though Steyer did well enough in the polls and earned spots in the debates, the rationale for his candidacy was never clear. Unlike his fellow billionaire Michael Bloomberg, he had never held elected office; his signature issue of climate change was shared by Washington Gov. Jay Inslee. When he dropped out in late February after earning no delegates, it was a whimpering end to a purposeless campaign. Steyer is a longtime Democratic mega-donor who has spent large sums on a variety of causes and candidates; betting on himself was surely one of the worst investments he ever made.
Michael Bloomberg’s presidential campaign
Bloomberg, in contrast to Steyer, had a rationale for his candidacy. At the time he entered the race, former Vice President Joe Biden seemed to be struggling and there was a potential lane available for a get-things-done moderate who had executive branch experience. (At least, that was likely what his consultants told him.) But it quickly became clear that Bloomberg had misjudged the moment. He failed to respond adequately to attacks from his fellow candidates at the first and only debate in which he participated, earning boos from the audience—and as it turned out, Biden was doing just fine occupying the moderate late by himself.
The former New York City mayor is not the first or last presidential candidate to see opportunity when it turned out there wasn’t any; nor is he the first or last high-net-worth individual to think his business know-how could carry him to the White House. What’s notable here is the Ozymandias-like burn rate: Bloomberg spent more than $1 billion on a campaign that lasted barely four months and left hardly a ripple in terms of political influence. Its lasting legacy may be the class-action lawsuit that former staffers have filed, alleging that Bloomberg promised to keep them on regardless of the primary outcome.
Amy McGrath’s Kentucky Senate run
On paper, McGrath was a great candidate: One of the first women Marine fighter pilots, she could present herself as both a feminist trailblazer and a patriot. She attracted media attention for her viral campaign ads in 2018 while running for Congress in Kentucky; she lost narrowly, but returned in 2020 to challenge Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, winning a close primary against the more progressive Charles Booker. Democratic partisans who despised McConnell could squint and imagine a blue wave coming in 2020 that not only knocked out obvious swing-state senators but made previously uncompetitive races winnable.
That did not happen. Even if 2020 had been an unfriendly environment for Republicans, McConnell—one of the most successful politicians of his generation—would have found a way to win in a red state where he’s been winning elections for decades. And it wasn’t even an unfriendly environment. McGrath lost by close to 20 points despite raising $88 million, over $30 million more than McConnell.
McGrath’s money came almost entirely from out of state, and 60% of it was from donations under $200. That suggests her funding was driven by her campaign’s nationality virality—more specifically, the idea that McConnell could lose encouraged many liberals to give her money. That’s one downside to small donors, which is that their money is not always directed at the right targets.
Jamie Harrison’s South Carolina Senate run
On the surface, Harrison looks a lot like McGrath: A Democrat running against a hated Republican incumbent (in this case, Sen. Lindsey Graham) in a traditionally red state. Harrison took in a record $107 million—again, most of it from small donors, most of it from out of state—dwarfing what Graham could spend.
But the polling in South Carolina was closer than it was in Kentucky, and unlike McGrath, Harrison also got a lot of money from major PACs, who are supposed to be savvier than your average ActBlue punter. The Senate Majority PAC put $5 million into the race; the Lincoln Project pitched in $2.5 million; and the League of Conservation Voters and MoveOn.org added about $2 million each. That indicates that even the nominally smart money thought this was a live race. It was not: Harrison lost by 10 points. Here, as in Kentucky, the Democratic Senate candidate simply wasn’t viable. But it took over $100 million to find that out.
The Texas legislature
For years, there have been complaints that Democrats didn’t focus enough on state legislature races, as they lost hundreds of elected offices in the Obama era. Since then, a number of organizations have attempted to channel anger at Trump into down-ballot races. 2018 was a coming-out party for these operations, with Democrats gaining more than 300 seats and flipping six legislative chambers. Twelve of those seats were gained in the 150-seat Texas House of Representatives, putting Democrats just nine short of a majority.
That made the 2020 state elections a target for every group focused on smaller races. Everytown for Gun Safety—a major gun control group funded in large part by Bloomberg—spent $2.2 million on digital ads and direct mailers. Forward Majority committed $12 million to state leg races. The National Democratic Redistricting Committee chipped in more than $1.3 million, and the Democratic Legislative Campaign Committee added $1.9 million. For that money, Democrats added exactly zero seats.
One conclusion is that Democrats should actually have spent much more money on state-level races. What if some of that McGrath money went to Texas House candidates who really needed it? But another lesson is that more money wouldn’t solve all the problems facing Democrats in Texas. Money wouldn’t have magically erased Republican gains among Hispanics in the state, or compelled Democrats to conduct in-person door-knocking operations (they were wary of doing so during the pandemic; Republicans were not, and this may have given them an advantage).
An unusual amount of enthusiasm helped Democrats from Biden on down fundraise at a never-before-seen scale in 2020. ActBlue made donating frictionless, and dozens of new organizations allowed a lot of this money to find its way to races that polling and smart strategists believed were winnable. This effort wasn’t wasted. It just wasn’t enough.
